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Abstract
In this paper we show experimentally that conditional cooperation, a phenomenon described
in the private provision of public goods, is also present in group contests, where participants’
contributions to their group performance partially determines if they overcome a rival group.
This environment allows us to identify new determinants of conditional cooperation. We
observe conditional cooperation in successful groups and in groups where members con-
tribute more than rivals (even if they lose), but it vanishes in those groups that lose the con-
test due to low group performance. A random-effect linear panel regression analysis with an
extensive set of controls confirms the findings.
1 Introduction
Conditional cooperation is the tendency of individuals to engage in cooperation depending on
the degree of cooperation of other individuals, and is argued to be one of the main sources of
high contributions in social dilemmas [1]. Numerous lab experiments [2–7] have documented
the existence of conditional cooperation using the public goods game. In an overview, [8]
reports that the findings are quite stable across studies, about 61% of participants being classi-
fied as conditional cooperators (followed by about 20% of free-riders). This behavior has been
described in other related environments, for instance, in collective-risk social dilemmas (a var-
iant of public goods games), where a group must achieve a given threshold through common
contributions to avoid a general loss (i.e., as a climate change environment), see [9–11]. It is
thus natural to assume that this behavior should at least partly explain how individuals behave
in group contests, i.e., situations in which members of a group face a social dilemma when
competing with other rival groups. [12–15] provide a nice introduction to the theory of group
contest.
Group contests are pervasive, including rent-seeking and lobbying, innovation tourna-
ments and R&D races or sports competitions. The experimental group contest literature con-
sistently finds that average effort level (though often showing a declining pattern) is
significantly higher than the equilibrium prediction, a phenomenon known as overexpendi-
ture, see for instance [16–23]. Some explanations provided by the literature are pure joy of
winning [24–27], bounded rationality [28–30], relative payoff maximization [31] and social
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identity [19]. Some studies investigate how participants react to feedback information about
others’ contribution in individual contests. For instance, [32] finds that individuals ranking
higher (lower) decrease (increase) their contribution. Similar findings were reported by [31,
33] in a different setup. [7] reports that most of the participants in individual contests with
fixed groups behave reciprocally to opponents’ previous choices. Surprisingly, the role of con-
ditional cooperation in group contests has not been analyzed yet. In this paper we approach
experimentally this question.
The first question when studying conditional cooperation in group contests is if such a
behavior is still present under the simultaneous presence of cooperation and competition.
Moreover, the group contest environment makes possible to test how conditional cooperation
is shaped by the competitive elements. In this environment, with the lottery contest success
function in place, the success of a group in the contest is due to a mixture of group behavior
and randomness. This allows us to test if conditional cooperation is affected by 1) the group
efforts (that may be larger or lower than those of the rival group) and 2) winning or losing the
contest just due to randomness.
To this aim, we carried out a laboratory experiment where subjects played a group contest.
Individuals where matched in groups of four subjects and each group played a contest against
a rival group repeatedly during 20 rounds. Subjects contributed from their individual endow-
ment to generate the group total contribution. Individual contributions were added up linearly
(known in the literature as a perfect substitution performance function). The probability of
winning the contest was proportional to the share of the group contribution in the sum of the
two groups’ contribution (known as the lottery contest success function, CSF hereafter).
Finally, the prize obtained by the winner group was shared equally among the group members
(known as the egalitarian sharing rule). We say that a group won the contest deservedly (by
chance) if the winning group’s total contribution was larger (lower) than the rival group’s total
contribution. Similarly, a group lost deservedly (by chance) if the group lost having a lower
(larger) group total contribution than the rival group’s total contribution. After each round,
the subjects received information about a) their group’s total contribution, b) the rival group’s
total contribution, and c) the winner of the contest. This informational setup allows us to iso-
late how individuals reacted a) to be in the winner or loser group, b) to be in a group that had a
larger or a lower total group contribution than the rival group. Hence, it gives us the opportu-
nity to test to which extent conditional cooperation is affected by these conditions.
As an illustration, consider the following example. In a group of 4 individuals, member A
contributes 200 tokens in a given round. She knows that the total contribution of her own
group was 1500 tokens, while that of the rival group was 1600 tokens. She knows also that the
rival group won the contest. In this case, member A is aware that her contribution was less
than the average of her group (200 < 1500/4 = 375) and that her group lost deservedly as they
accumulated less tokens than the rival group. In the next round, when deciding how much to
contribute to the group performance from her endowment, member A may be affected by the
fact that a) she contributed less than the average contribution in her group; b) they have lost
the contest; c) her group accumulated less tokens than the rival group. The first factor is the
standard conditional cooperation argument studied in social dilemma games (see, for instance,
[3, 4]) that assumes that individuals tend to conform to the others in their group when decid-
ing how much to contribute to the cooperative effort. This may be driven by social preferences
like altruism [34], fairness [35] or inequality aversion [36]. The second factor (winning or los-
ing the contest) may affect the participants in several ways. On the one hand, they may derive
non-monetary utility from winning the contest [27] or they may be driven by relative payoff
maximization [24, 31]. On the other hand, the aforementioned social preferences affecting
cooperation may be enhanced through the contest, participants having stronger feelings
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toward in-group members and being hostile toward members of the rival group as proposed
by theories like parochial altruism [37–39] or social identity [19, 22, 40, 41]. Note that the con-
test may strengthen or weaken the effect of standard conditional cooperation. For instance, in
our example member A may feel bad having contributed less than the average to the group
performance and this feeling is exacerbated by the fact that the group lost. Hence, in the next
round she may feel urged to increase her contribution to conform to the others in the group
and to increase the probability of winning the contest. However, imagine that member A’s
group wins the contest in the previous example. Then her desire to conform to the others may
be mitigated by the fact that her group won in spite of her lower-than-average contribution.
Thus, it is an empirical question to find out how the competitive element affects conditional
contribution. The third factor (winning or losing deservedly or not) adds a nuance to the effect
of winning or losing. If a group wins after having contributed more than the rival group, then
a group member may feel more comfortable than if the group wins by chance. In the latter
case, a participant may be more inclined to change her behavior in order to increase the proba-
bility of winning in the next round. The opposite argument applies to the case of losing,
because losing after having accumulated more tokens than the rival group (that is, by chance)
may feel better than losing deservedly (that, in turn, may urge participants to change their con-
tributions in the next round).
Based of the former arguments, we formulate the following conjectures. If a participant
contributed less (more) than the average contribution in her group in the previous round,
then in the current round she will increase (decrease) her contribution as an attempt to move
toward the group average. If the participant contributed less than the group average in the pre-
vious round, then her behavior to conform with the group average is strengthened if her group
lost the contest. Having lost deservedly (by chance) may make her more (less) likely to increase
her contribution. If her group won the contest, then she may be less willing to conform to the
group average. This lack of willingness is stronger (weaker) if her group won deservedly (by
chance). We expect the opposite if the participant contributed more than the group average in
the previous round. She will decrease her contribution, and more so if her group won. Having
won deservedly (by chance) makes her decrease her contribution more (less). If her group lost
in the previous round, then her desire to decrease her contribution may be mitigated. Having
lost deservedly (by chance) makes her decrease her contribution less (more).
We summarize the conjectures in Table 1. Note that we expect that the participants are
most likely to increase their contributions if they contributed less than the group average in
the previous round and their group lost deservedly, because in this case all the factors that we
expect to affect contribution point toward increasing the contribution. Similarly, we expect
Table 1. Conjectures: Reaction to group average in the previous round, conditioned by winning / losing, deservedly / by chance.
Effect 1 Effect 2 Effect 3
Contribution < group average in t-1 positive Her group won in t-1 negative deservedly negative
by chance positive
Her group lost in t-1 positive deservedly positive
by chance negative
Contribution > group average in t-1 negative Her group won in t-1 negative deservedly negative
by chance positive
Her group lost in t-1 positive deservedly positive
by chance negative
Positive: increase contribution, negative: decrease contribution.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0244152.t001
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that participants are most likely to decrease their contributions if they contributed more than
the average in the previous round and they won deservedly. We expect the least reaction to
having contributed less (more) than the group average when the group won (lost) deservedly.
In the following section we describe our experiment, then we present the results and finally
we conclude.
2 The experiment
We ran a session at the LINEEX lab in Valencia in July, 2018. The share of males was 41.1%,
and participants had a diverse background. The composition of the subject pool according to
field of study was the following: 29% Social Sciences and Law, 27% Health Sciences, 20% Engi-
neering and Architecture, 13% Business and / or Economics, 7% Arts and Humanities, 4% Sci-
ence. The session started with the group contest, followed by experimental games to gather
information about the participants’ characteristics and a questionnaire. More concretely, we
measured social attitudes using the social value orientation task [42], cooperativeness using
the public goods game, risk preferences using the bomb risk elicitation task [43], competitive-
ness using the competitiveness game á la Niederle-Vesterlund [44]. There was no feedback on
performance between these experimental measurements. Complete instructions are in S4
Appendix.
Participants knew that they would be paid for the group contest and from the other experi-
mental games the computer would pick randomly one to be paid. At the beginning of the
experiment the participants received a consent sheet that they read and signed (if they agreed)
before starting the experiment. This written consent contained information about the experi-
ment, the confidentiality of the data and the anonymity of the decisions. No minors were
involved in the experiment.
For the group contest, 14 groups of four were formed randomly and anonymously.
Although making uncertain the number of rounds would have avoided the last-round effect,
in order to have a setup comparable with previous experiments on group contests, we followed
[16], so groups were fixed for the 20 rounds of the group contest and the rival group remained
the same as well. Participants were endowed with 1000 tokens at the beginning of each round.
They could buy competition tokens for their groups, one competition token costing one
token. Unused tokens added to the payoff of the participant. We used the lottery CSF, so in
each round the probability of winning the contest was proportional to the total competition
tokens of a given group divided by the competition tokens of both groups. The winner group
received a prize of 4000 tokens, each member obtaining an equal share (1000 tokens). At the
end of each round, each participant received information i) on the amount of competition
tokens that she bought; ii) on the total amount of competition tokens of the group; iii) on the
total amount of competition tokens of the rival group; iv) on whether the group the participant
belonged to had won the contest; v) on the individual payoff in the round. Note, therefore, that
the first round was informatively different from the rest of rounds, because subjects did not
have the additional information on the results of the previous round.
Earnings in the group contest amounted to the sum of the payoffs of 5 randomly chosen
rounds (as, for instance, in [19, 28]). Overall, the experiment lasted two hours and participants
earned 16 euros on average (including the show-up fee of 5 Euro and the payment for the
experimental games to elicit participants’ characteristics).
3 Findings
Fig 1 indicates the share of participants who decided to increase or decrease their contribution
depending on their behavior with respect to the group in the previous round, averaged over all
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decisions. (In Fig 1 we consider all the decisions unconditionally, while Table 2 also indicates
the corresponding numbers conditional on winning / losing and the nature of winning and
losing. Hence, Fig 1 depicts the row overall of the top and bottom panels in Table 2). Fig 1
shows that participants increase their contribution more frequently after having contributed
less than the group average in the previous round, and that they decrease their contribution
more frequently after having contributed more than the group average in the previous round.
This suggests that there is conditional contribution in the group contest, the phenomenon
being more emphatic upon having contributed less than the group average in the previous
round.
In Table 2 we show how participants reacted to when they contributed less / equal / more
than the group average in the previous round (that we denote as round t-1), conditional on the
result of the group contest. Note that subjects knew their own contribution and the group’s
total contribution, so they could infer if they contributed more or less than the group average.
We conjecture that in a group contest the result of the competition may affect the reactions
(see Table 1). That is, if a group won or lost the contest in the previous round, then it may
influence individual contribution (see the lines winner / loser). Since participants knew their
own and the rival group’s total contribution, they also knew if winning / losing was due to
either gathering more competition tokens than the rival group (we call that deserved winner /
chance loser) or having made less contribution than the rival group (chance winner / deserved
Fig 1. Share of participants decreasing / not changing / increasing their contribution depending on if their
contribution was less (N = 593) / more (N = 464) than the group average in the previous round. Averaged over all
data points.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0244152.g001
Table 2. Participants’ reaction to if their contribution was less / more than the group average in the previous round.
Decrease contribution No change in t Increase contribution # observations
Contribution< Average in t-1
overall 23.95% 29.51% 46.54% 593
winner / loser 20.14% / 27.54% 36.46% / 22.95% 43.40% / 49.51% 288 / 305
deserved winner / loser 21.66% / 23.30% 36.31% / 22.73% 42.04% / 53.98% 157 / 176
chance winner / loser 18.32% / 33.33% 36.64% / 23.26% 45.04% / 43.41% 131 / 129
Contribution = Average in t-1
overall 42.86% 28.57% 28.57% 7
Contribution> Average in t-1
overall 44.61% 20.26% 35.13% 464
winner / loser 42.26% / 47.11% 25.52% / 14.67% 32.22% / 38.22% 239 / 225
deserved winner / loser 42.45% / 34.96% 29.5% / 8.13% 28.06% / 56.91% 139 / 123
chance winner / loser 42% / 61.76% 20% / 22.55% 38% / 15.69% 100 / 102
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0244152.t002
PLOS ONE Conditional cooperation in group contests
PLOS ONE | https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0244152 December 23, 2020 5 / 13
loser). Table 2 depicts all these cases, where we provide the percentage of subjects that choose
to increase or decrease their contribution in round t given their behavior with respect to their
group in t-1.
Those who contributed the average amount, tend to decrease their contribution. The most
frequent choice of participants who contributed less (more) than the group average in the pre-
vious round is to increase (decrease) their contributions, in line with the idea of conditional
cooperation, though the relative frequency generally is below 50%. This finding holds for par-
ticipants in loser and winner groups as well, the effect being somewhat stronger when contri-
bution was less than the group average in t-1. Belonging to a winner or loser group by chance
or deservedly also affects how participants react to having contributed more or less than the
group average in round t-1. As expected, the share of those who increased their contribution
was highest among those who contributed less than the group average in the previous round
and who were in a group that lost deservedly. In fact, in this case the relative frequency of
those who increased contribution rises above 50%. However, even in those cases when some-
body contributed less than the group average in the previous round (we expect that they would
increase their contribution, see Table 1), even if she was in a group that won (which has a nega-
tive effect on contribution, according to Table 1) deservedly (again having a negative effect on
contribution, see Table 1), increasing the contribution has the highest relative frequency, but
in this case well below 50%.
If somebody contributed more than the average, then we expect that she would decrease
her contribution according to conditional cooperation. As already commented, overall and
also when considering being in a winner and loser group the relatively most frequent reaction
is in line with this conjecture. We expected to see the strongest effect when a group wins
deservedly (see Table 1), however, contrary to our conjecture, the relative frequency in that
case is not the highest. We observe the highest share decreasing their contribution in case of
those who were in groups that lost by chance. The only case contradicting the idea of condi-
tional cooperation occurs for those who contributed more than the group average in round t-1
and were in a group that lost after accumulating less competition tokens than the rival group
(deserved loser). In more than 50% of this case contributions increased, even if participants
contributed already more than the group average in the previous round.
Chance losers tend to move toward the group average, independently if they contributed
more or less than the group average, the effect being stronger in the latter case. Chance win-
ners’ reaction is in line with conditional cooperation, as the most frequent reaction is to move
towards the group average.
As a robustness check, we study how conclusions change if we consider contributing more
/ less than the average if it is at least +/- 20% than the average. S1 Table in S1 Appendix reveals
that qualitatively we have the same findings.
The idea of conditional contribution is directional in the sense that conditional contribu-
tors move toward the average contribution. For instance, both [4] and [8] define conditional
contributors based on if an individual’s contribution increases (at least in a weakly monotonic
way) in the other individuals’ contribution or using correlation measures between own and
others’ contribution. However, it is also natural to ask how is the size of the moves toward the
average. Hence, after seeing the direction of the changes, we turn now to the magnitudes.
Table 3 provides information on the average size of the change in contribution joint with the
standard deviation in each of the cases. When considering the case of having contributed less
than the group average in round t-1, we see that size of change (in absolute value) is markedly
higher for those who decreased their contribution. This is true overall and also if we condition
on winning or losing and on doing so deservedly or by chance. Hence, while upon falling
short of the group average in round t-1 the share of those who increase their contribution in
PLOS ONE Conditional cooperation in group contests
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round t is higher (and often by a wide margin) than the share of those who decrease, those in
the latter group decrease much more their contribution on average than those who increase
their contribution. This suggests that even if increasing contribution (the choice in line with
the idea of conditional cooperation) is the most frequently observed reaction among those
who contributed less than average in round t-1, their impact on overall contribution may be
neutralized by participants who decrease their contribution in the same condition due to the
fact that in the latter group the size of the change is larger.
Turning to those who in round t-1 contributed more than the average, we observe that in
this group those who decrease their contribution (in line with conditional cooperation), do so
by a larger extent than those who increase their contribution. This happens in all cases, except
for chance losers. Hence, for those contributing more than the average in the previous round,
it is not just the share of those who decrease their contribution in the next round is higher, but
also the size of their reaction is larger than the size of those who react in the opposite way.
The fact that the magnitude of decreases is larger than the magnitude of increases indepen-
dently if the contribution in the previous round was less / equal / more than the group average
is partly due to the fact that there is a downward trend in the level of contributions (see S2
Appendix) that implies that overall decreases are larger than increases. Interestingly, while the
size of the decreases is similar when contribution in the previous round was less or more than
the group average, for increases we observe an asymmetry. The magnitude of increases is
clearly larger when contribution in the previous round was already above the group average.
We have no explanation why this happens. More research is needed to understand these sur-
prising findings.
In order to see if conditional contribution plays a significant role in the participants’ deci-
sions, we carry out a random-effect linear panel regression (see Table 4), where we exploit the
Table 3. Mean size of participants’ reaction to if their contribution was less / more than the group average in the previous round (Standard deviation in
parentheses).
Decrease contribution Increase contribution # observations
Contribution< Average in t-1
overall -46.33 20.22 593
(27.37) (21.59)
winner / loser -40.20 /-50.57 17.84/22.20 288 / 305
(27.83)/(26.39) (21.21)/(21.78)
deserved winner / loser -40.47/-54.31 18.34/20.74 157 / 176
(29.32)/(26.10) (21.84)/(18.65)
chance winner / loser -39.80/-47.01 17.29/24.66 131 / 129
(26.18)/(26.48) (20.66)/(26.26)
Contribution = Average in t-1
overall -81.67 7.74 7
(7.64) (0.84)
Contribution> Average in t-1
overall -46.92 38.80 464
(30.30) (32.06)
winner / loser -42.22/-51.39 34.38/42.76 239 / 225
(29.85)/(30.18) (29.41)/(33.94)
deserved winner / loser -42.04/ -51.47 36.55/40.39 139 / 123
(31.64)/(30.77) (29.82)/(32.24)
chance winner / loser -42.48/-51.34 32.15/53.17 100/ 102
(27.51)/(30.03) (29.21)/(40.06)
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0244152.t003
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panel dimension of our dataset. (Confidence intervals are provided in S2 Table, see S3
Appendix).
The dependent variable is the percentage change in individual contribution in round t with
respect to t-1. Percentage change is computed as the percentage of variation with respect to the
maximum possible variation. Since contribution is in the range of [0, 1000], it implies, for
instance, that after having contributed 800, changing to 400 is a -50% of variation and chang-
ing to 900 is a +50% of variation. We use percentage change because there is a downward
trend in contribution in our data (see S1 Fig of S2 Appendix), so a decrease of 100 tokens is
not the same in relative terms at the beginning of the experiment as at the end.
The explanatory variable of main interest is the individual contribution in round t-1 relative
to the average group contribution in t-1 in percentage (measuring percentage as in the depen-
dent variable), so here we are not only interested if an individual contributed more or less than
the group average in t-1, but we also take into account the degree of deviation from the group
average. In all specifications, we also control for round as the change in individual contribu-
tion may vary over time. In specification 2 we add the effect of losing or winning deservedly or
by chance in the previous round, deserved loser being the baseline case. Note that subjects
received information on whether their group had accumulated more competition tokens than
Table 4. Determinants of the percentage change in individual’s contribution in t with respect to t-1. Random effects linear panel regression model.
Dependent variable: Percentage change in individual contribution in round t with respect to t-1
Spec. 1 Spec. 2 Spec. 3 Spec. 4
i’s contribution (t-1) w.r.t avg group contribution (t-1) in pc -0.081��� -0.074��� 0.001 -0.060
(0.021) (0.021) (0.037) (0.039)
Round -0.609��� -0.628��� -0.600��� -0.622���
(0.222) (0.221) (0.221) (0.219)
Winner by chance (t-1) -2.993 -3.310 -2.780
(3.455) (3.448) (3.428)
Winner deserved (t-1) -4.074 -5.301 -5.388
(3.243) (3.274) (3.353)
Loser by chance (t-1) -13.375��� -14.593��� -14.447���
(3.471) (3.498) (3.554)
i’s wrt gr’s contribution (t-1) x winner chance (t-1) -0.061 -0.056
(0.039) (0.039)
i’s wrt gr’s contribution (t-1) x winner deserv (t-1) -0.057 -0.044
(0.044) (0.044)
i’s wrt gr’s contribution (t-1) x loser chance (t-1) -0.136��� -0.109��
(0.046) (0.047)
Covariates YES
Constant 1.147 6.187� 7.674�� -67.432
(2.742) (3.391) (3.437) (45.978)
R2 0.020 0.034 0.043 0.079
Observations 1064 1064 1064 1064
Standard errors in parentheses.
Random effects linear panel regression model.
Dependent variable normalized.
� p < 0.10,
�� p < 0.05,
��� p< 0.01
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0244152.t004
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the rival group and if they had won or lost, and therefore information on winning and losing
and having done so deservedly or by chance was correlated. However, that information
uniquely determined if the group had been a winner or a loser by chance or deservedly, and
therefore the included dummy variables are orthogonal by construction. In specification 3 we
also add interaction terms to see if the percentage change in individual contribution from t-1
to t is different based on winning or losing the contest after having accumulated more or less
competition tokens than the rival group has a differential effect. In the last specification we
also use controls related to socio-demographics (female, age, academic degree, number of sib-
lings, body mass index, digit ratio, breadwinner’s employment and participant’s work per
week), IQ variables (being reflective or irreflective in the Cognitive Reflection test [45–47])
and the economic preferences that we elicited in the questionnaire.
In specifications 1 and 2 the coefficient of the main explanatory variable is negative and sig-
nificant, indicating that having contributed more (or less) than the group average in round t-1
provokes a move in the opposite direction. We view it as strong evidence on conditional coop-
eration in contests. Round has always a negative and significant coefficient, showing a down-
ward trend. In specification 2, we find that being in a group that loses by chance is the only
group outcome that has a significant effect. The estimated coefficient indicates that it reduces
contribution change in 13 pp, relative to deserved loser groups, as conjectured (see Table 1).
Contribution change after losing deservedly or winning (by chance or deservedly) is not statis-
tically different, and higher than in the case of being in a group that loses by chance. In specifi-
cation 3 we interact the group outcomes with the difference between own contribution and
the average of the group in round t-1. Note that contributing differently than the group aver-
age in round t-1, the explanatory variable of main interest is not significant any more, however
the interaction between this variable and loser by chance is negative and is the only significant
new variable. It indicates that the effect of differing from the group average is significantly dif-
ferent when the individual is in a group that loses by chance. These findings hold even if we
add the remaining control variables (specification 4).
Specifications 3 and 4 allow us to understand how conditional cooperation depends on the
different elements of the environment. In order to check the occurrence of conditional cooper-
ation, we test the combination of the relevant coefficients (see Table 5). We find that condi-
tional contribution matters and participants significantly approximate their contribution to
the group’s average if they belong to a winner group (either by chance or deservedly) or to a
group that loses by chance. However, this effect vanishes (is not significant) in the baseline
case, that is, when the group loses deservedly. This is not surprising as we have seen that in
Table 5. Testing when participants behave as predicted by conditional cooperation.
Spec. 3 Spec. 4
Coefficient Coefficient
i’s contr. (t-1) wrt gr + (i’s wrt gr X winner by chance) -0.061� -0.116���
i’s contr. (t-1) wrt gr + (i’s wrt gr X winner deserved) -0.056� -0.104���
i’s contr. (t-1) wrt gr + (i’s wrt gr X loser by chance) -0.135��� -0.169���
constant + winner by chance 4.364 -70.212
constant + winner deserved 2.373 -72.821
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that case participants tend to increase their contributions, independently of how their contri-
butions relate to the average contribution in the previous round (see Table 2).
4 Conclusion and discussiom
We report experimental evidence on conditional cooperation being present in group contests
as overall the most frequent reaction to having contributed more (less) than the group average
in the previous round is to decrease (increase) contribution. We also show that the outcome of
the group contest also affects conditional cooperation. Conditional cooperation is not
observed in the group contest after losing deservedly, however participants do approximate
their behavior to the group’s average when being in a winner group or after losing by chance
in the previous round. Hence, similarly to public goods game, we document the existence of
conditional cooperation in group contest, except when being in a deserved loser group.
While these findings reveal the role of conditonal cooperation in group contests, it is
important to consider some limitations. We lack an explanation for some of the asymmetric
behaviors observed in the experiment. In particular, the change in contributions is larger when
contribution in the previous round was already larger than the group average relative to the
case when contribution in the previous round was smaller than the group average. Moreover,
though the coefficient of the main variable of interest in Table 4 behaves as expected, the over-
all explanatory power of the regressions is rather low. This suggests that there are additional
important factors that shape decision-making. More research is needed to find out what those
factors are and if they are related to conditional cooperation in this environment. Further
research should also reveal to what extent the findings depend on specific elements of the envi-
ronment. Importantly, group contests come in many formats (see [15]) that may affect the
behavior of the subjects, and our experiment uses just one of the standard contest setups. For
instance, if instead of the lottery CSF the auction CSF is used (when the group with the highest
performance wins the contest with certainty) and as a consequence the uncertainty involved in
the determination of the winner is eliminated, subjects may be more willing to increase contri-
butions as it is clearer how it augments the chances to win. Hence, we believe that investigating
the effect of the elements of group contest on conditional cooperation is a promising venue for
future research.
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